Abstract
It is less rational to rely on a coerced promise than it is to rely either on a coerced (non-promissory) action or on a non-coerced promise. This chapter defends a two-part explanation for that intuitive judgment. First, coerced promises carry no moral force. That is, they do not generate additional moral reasons, above and beyond whatever reasons already exist, for the promiser to fulfill her promise. This undercuts the idea that the general moral obligation to keep one's promises can be used to defend the reliability of coerced promises—that general obligation does not apply to coerced promises. The chapter argues for this thesis by, first, explaining why the importance we attach to the activity of promising cannot extend to coerced promises and, second, refuting four recent alleged counterexamples to the thesis. The second part of the explanation is that coerced promises carry no predictive force either. That is, they do not communicate reliable intentions to fulfill the promise, even independently of moral motivations. This undercuts the idea that the promissory intentions can be used to defend the reliability of coerced promises—the general connection between promising and intending does not apply to coerced promises. The chapter defends this thesis by arguing that, while it is possible to coerce promissory intentions, rational agents may be unable to promise sincerely when threatened, and, further, coerced promises typically give no evidential support that the promiser intends to do as she says.