Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions

Colin Campbell; Octavian Carare; Richard P McLean

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.001

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Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions

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Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions

Colin Campbell, Octavian Carare and Richard P McLean

Economics letters, Vol.86(1), pp.95-100

2005

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.07.001

Abstract

Asymmetry

Discriminatory auctions

We examine the efficiency and revenue properties of an asymmetric discriminatory auction with two bidders and two objects. While inefficient, a discriminatory auction may result in higher expected revenue than the efficient Vickrey auction.

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Title: Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
Creators: Colin Campbell - Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Octavian Carare - The University of Texas at Dallas
Richard P McLean - Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Publication Details: Economics letters, Vol.86(1), pp.95-100
Date published: 2005
Publisher: Elsevier B.V
Academic Unit: Economics (SAS)
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article
Identifiers: 991031716707904646