On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau; Richard P McLean

doi:10.1287/moor.2017.0849

Back

On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Journal article

Peer reviewed

On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard P McLean

Mathematics of operations research, Vol.43(1), pp.100-129

02/01/2018

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0849

Abstract

Mathematics

Mathematics, Applied

Operations Research & Management Science

Physical Sciences

Science & Technology

Technology

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

Metrics

13 Record Views

23 Times Cited - Web of Science

Details

Title: On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games
Creators: Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau - Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Richard P McLean - Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Publication Details: Mathematics of operations research, Vol.43(1), pp.100-129
Date published: 02/01/2018
Publisher: INFORMS
Number of pages: 30
Grant note: Becker-Friedman Institute at the University of Chicago
Academic Unit: Economics (SAS)
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article
Identifiers: 991031716193004646